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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
JURISDICTION OVER IMPORTS CONTROVERSIES AFTER
THE CUSTOMS COURTS ACT OF 1980-ALBERTA GAS
CHEMICALS, LTD v. CELANESE CORP.
In March, 1979, the Treasury Department issued a determina-
tion that methanol produced by plaintiff, Alberta Gas Chemicals,
Inc., would likely be sold at less than its fair value.1 A hearing
was then held before the International Trade Commission to deter-
mine whether the importation of methanol at less than its fair value
would likely injure the domestic methanol industry.2 Celanese Cor-
poration, the largest domestic producer of methanol, testified at
this hearing concerning the projected demand for methanol in the
United States during the 1980's.1 Pursuant to the Commission's
determination of likely injury, the Treasury Department issued
a Finding of Dumping that would subject plaintiff to special anti-
dumping duties on the methanol.' Plaintiff challenged the Finding
of Dumping in two forums. In August, 1979, plaintiff filed an ac-
tion against the United States in the Customs Court, now the Court
of International Trade,5 seeking an adjudication that the Finding
of Dumping was "illegal, null, and void."' While the case was still
pending in that court, plaintiff filed a second action against Celanese
Corporation alleging that false testimony presented by Celanese
at the hearing before the Commission resulted in the Finding of
Dumping.7 The district court dismissed the case for failure to state
' Alberta Gas Chems., Inc. v. United States, 483 F. Supp. 303, 305 (Cust. Ct. 1980). Plain-
tiff filed an action in the Customs Court but the suit was dismissed as prematurely filed,
i.e., prior to the issuance of a Finding of Dumping by the Treasury Department. Alberta
Gas Chems., Inc. v. Blumenthal, 467 F. Supp. 1245, 1256 (Cust. Ct. 1979). This action will
not be discussed further.
2 Alberta Gas Chems., Ltd. v. Celanese Corp., 497 F. Supp. 637, 639 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
' Id. at 638-39.
' Id. at 639.
' Customs Courts Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-417, 94 Stat. 1727 (codified in scattered
sections of 19, 28 U.S.C.A. (West Supp. 1982)). The Customs Courts Act of 1980 renamed
the Customs Court as the United States Court of International Trade. Id. S 101, 28 U.S.C.A.
S 251.
' Alberta Gas Chems., Inc. v. United States, 483 F. Supp. 303, 306 (Cust. Ct. 1980).
7 Alberta Gas Chems., Ltd. v. Celanese Corp., 497 F. Supp. 637, 638-39 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
On appeal, the action was characterized as one in which the plaintiff sought damages and
an injunction compelling Celanese to provide the Commission with correct information con-
cerning the demand for methanol. Alberta Gas Chems., Ltd. v. Celanese Corp., 650 F.2d
9, 11 (2d Cir. 1981).
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. [Vol. 12:231
a cause of action.' On appeal, the Second Circuit held that the In-
ternational Trade Commission has inherent power to reconsider
its decisions if fraud is alleged in its proceedings. Alberta Gas
Chemicals, Ltd. v. Celanese Corp., 650 F.2d 9 (2d Cir. 1981).
The Customs Courts Act of 1980' realigned jurisdiction over im-
ports controversies between the federal district courts and the
Court of International Trade, as the Customs Court has been re-
named, by expanding the jurisdiction of the latter.10 This realign-
ment implements the constitutional mandate for uniformity in
customs matters." It also relieves the overcrowding of the federal
district courts"2 and utilizes the expertise of the judges of the Court
of International Trade in highly technical customs cases."
Prior to the passage of the Act, a "confusing jurisdictional
morass"'4 existed in which cases were frequently dismissed on
jurisdictional grounds rather than being decided on their merits. 5
Three major jurisdictional problems emerged in cases litigated dur-
ing the 1970's.11 First, designation of the proper court to deter-
mine which court had jurisdiction was not clearly settled." Second,
' Alberta Gas Chems., Ltd. v. Celanese Corp., 497 F. Supp. 637, 641 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
' Customs Courts Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-417, 94 Stat. 1727 (codified in scattered
sections of 19, 28 U.S.C.A. (West Supp. 1982)). Hereinafter, the court will be referred to
as the Customs Court in reference to cases decided or under review prior to the passage
of the Act.
10 Customs Courts Act of 1980 S 201, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1581-83.
" The Constitution of the United States requires uniformity in the application and inter-
pretation of customs laws. U.S. CONST. art. I, S 8. Such uniformity was difficult to achieve
when customs matters were litigated before judges in district courts throughout the coun-
try as well as the specialized Customs Court. E.g., Customs Courts Act: Hearing on S. 2857
Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 68-70 (1978) (statement of Hon. Edward D. Re) [hereinafter
cited as 1978 Senate Hearing]; see generally Re, Litigation Before the United States Court
of International Trade, 26 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 437,437-38 (1981); Rodino, The Customs Courts
Act of 1980, 26 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 459, 459 (1981).
12 Customs Courts Act of 1980: Hearings on H.R. 6394 Before the Subcomm. on Monopolies
and Commercial Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1980)
(statement of Sen. DeConcini) [hereinafter cited as 1980 Hearings]. In a recent overview
of suggested solutions to the congestion in the federal courts, however, the removal of
tax and patent litigation from the district courts was recommended without mention of
customs and imports litigation. Clark, A Commentary on Congestion in the Federal Courts,
8 ST. MARY'S L.J. 407 (1976).
1 See, e.g., 1978 Senate Hearings, supra note 11, at 47.
14 Id. at 49 (statement of Barbara Babcock).
15 See, e.g., 1980 Hearings, supra note 12, at 51 (statement of David M. Cohen).
18 While Congress recognized the need for revision of the jurisdiction of the Customs
Court during the 1960's, it limited the Customs Courts Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-271,
84 Stat. 274 (1970) (amended 1980), to procedural matters, leaving the jurisdictional pro-
blems for later resolution. S. REP. No. 94-466, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1979).
" The Customs Court has been held to be the proper forum for determining its own
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many decisions concerning which court had jurisdiction actually
turned on the adequacy of the relief available in the Customs
Court. 8 Third, many courts expressed concern that plaintiffs were
manipulating jurisdiction by including ancillary claims in order to
avoid the Customs Court. 9
Procedures have varied for determining whether a federal
district court may assert proper jurisdiction over an imports con-
troversy. The difficulty of the question apparently has resulted
in a refusal on the part of some courts to decide their own jurisdic-
tion. In one case, a federal district court refused to decide its
jurisdiction and ordered the plaintiffs to refile their action in the
Customs Court in order that the latter court might decide whether
it had jurisdiction.0 Another case reached the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia before being sent to the Customs Court
for a decision concerning its jurisdiction." In the foregoing situa-
tions, the district court retained jurisdiction in case the Customs
Court found that it lacked jurisdiction.22 In other cases, a district
court itself has found that the Customs Court had jurisdiction, and
that finding has been upheld by the circuit court of appeals without
any prior input from the Customs Court.23
The inadequacy of relief available in the Customs Court was
usually an insufficient basis for ousting that court's jurisdiction.24
jurisdiction even when the action was brought in a federal district court. E.g., SCM Corp.
v. United States International Trade Commission, 549 F.2d 812, 821 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Barclay
Industries, Inc. v. Carter, 494 F. Supp. 912, 912-13 (D.D.C. 1980). A federal district court
may properly decide, however, that it does not have jurisdiction over a customs matter.
E.g., Cornet Stores v. Morton, 632 F.2d 96, 100 (9th Cir. 1980); Sneaker Circus, Inc. v. Carter,
566 F.2d 396, 398 (2d Cir. 1977). In the latter case, the Court of Appeals reversed the district
court's finding of lack of jurisdiction.
, E.g., Cornet Stores v. Morton, 632 F.2d 96, 100 (9th Cir. 1980); Jerlian Watch Co.,
Inc. v. United States Department of Commerce, 597 F.2d 687, 687 (9th Cir. 1979); Flintkote
Co. v. Blumenthal, 596 F.2d 51, 58 (2d Cir. 1979); Barclay Industries, Inc. v. Carter, 494
F. Supp. 912, 914 (D.D.C. 1980). The Customs Courts Act of 1980 explicitly grants to the
Court of International Trade powers in law and equity equivalent to those of a federal
district court, thereby eliminating most bases for challenging jurisdiction on the grounds
of the inability of the court to grant full relief. Customs Courts Act of 1980 S 201, 28 U.S.C.A.
S 1585.
" E.g., Cornet Stores v. Morton, 632 F.2d 96, 98 (9th Cir. 1980); Barclay Industries, Inc.
v. Carter, 494 F. Supp. 912, 913 (D.D.C. 1980); Flintkote Co. v. Blumenthal, 469 F. Supp.
115, 124 (N.D.N.Y.), affd, 596 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1979).
' Sybron Corp. v. Carter, 438 F. Supp. 863 (W.D.N.Y. 1977).
", SCM Corp. v. United States International Trade Commission, 549 F.2d 812, 821 (D.C.
Cir. 1977); SCM Corp. v. United States, 450 F. Supp. 1178, 1194 (Cust. Ct. 1978).
= See supra notes 20 and 21.
Cornet Stores v. Morton, 632 F.2d 96, 97 (9th Cir. 1980); Jerlian Watch Co., Inc. v.
United States Department of Commerce, 597 F.2d 687, 692 (9th Cir. 1979).
' See supra note 18.
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Only in the case where a plaintiff had no means whatsoever for
obtaining jurisdiction in the Customs Court could a district court
properly take jurisdiction over an imports controversy. 5 Even the
class action status of a suit filed in a district court was not suffi-
cient for the assertion of jurisdiction by the district court if the
issue could be resolved in the Customs Court in an individual suit.'
Nor was financial impossibility of a plaintiffs pursuit of a remedy
in Customs Court a sufficient reason for a district court to grant
relief when the Customs Court had jurisdiction.'
Related to the issue of the adequacy of the remedy available
in the Customs Court is a concern that all issues in a controversy
be determined in a single forum. This concern, however, was not
a sufficient reason for a district court to take jurisdiction over
a case otherwise within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Customs
Court. 8 Courts have often expressed reservations about plaintiffs'
motives in including claims in their complaints that are outside
the jurisdiction of the Customs Court.'
In summary, prior to the passage of the Customs Courts Act
of 1980, jurisdictional issues frequently were litigated in imports
cases. The courts were split on whether the jurisdiction of the
Customs Court should be decided by the Customs Court itself or
the district court; jurisdiction was readily found to be in the Cus-
toms Court despite the lack of complete relief available in that
forum.
Barclay Industries, Inc. v. Carter, 494 F. Supp. 912, 914 (D.D.C. 1980). The court found
that even though the district court would be a more satisfactory forum, Customs Court
jurisdiction would not be defeated. Id.
26 Id.
' Jerlian Watch Co. v. United States Department of Commerce, 597 F.2d 687, 692 (9th
Cir. 1979). The court explained its holding as follows: "If we were to hold that financial
impossibility placed plaintiffs within the 'adequate remedy' exception to Customs Court
jurisdiction, we would be carving out a large exception to Customs Court jurisdiction that
Congress did not intend in providing for the uniform administration of the customs laws." Id.
Barclay Industries, Inc. v. Carter, 494 F. Supp. 912, 913 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Flintkote Co.
v. Blumenthal, 469 F. Supp. 115, 124 (N.D.N.Y.), affd, 596 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1979).
' One court contended that plaintiffs "could escape the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Customs Court simply by alleging violations of other statutes or of constitutional provi-
sions," Barclay Industries, Inc. v. Carter, 494 F. Supp. 912, 913 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), and that
the plaintiffs in the case before it had sought purposefully to avoid Customs Court jurisdiction
by framing their complaint to fall within the exceptions to its exclusive jurisdiction. Id.
Another court described a claim before it as seeking "some kind of ancillary relief in con-
nection with a matter that ultimately must be decided, if at all, by the United States Customs
Court." Flintkote Co. v. Blumenthal, 469 F. Supp. 115, 124 (N.D.N.Y.), affd, 596 F.2d 51
(2d Cir. 1979). The court denied the ancillary relief. Id. at 126. The Ninth Circuit has ex-
pressed its concern that plaintiffs are advancing "creative arguments ... in hopes of avoiding
the exclusivity of Customs Court jurisdiction." Cornet Stores v. Morton, 632 F.2d 96, 98
(9th Cir. 1980).
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The Customs Courts Act of 1980 greatly expands the jurisdic-
tion of the Court of International Trade. The Act enumerates
several areas of exclusive jurisdiction for the Court of Interna-
tional Trade. 0 It also provides a residual category of jurisdiction
for actions arising under any other federal laws concerning inter-
national trade.31 In addition, the court is granted exclusive jurisdic-
tion over counterclaims, cross-claims, and third-party actions in-
volving imported merchandise that is the subject matter of an
original action before the court.2 The purpose of this provision
is to ensure that the rights of all parties in a single controversy
are adjudicated in a single forum.3 The powers of the Court of
International Trade are designated explicity as fully equivalent
to those of a federal district court. ' This provision should serve
to prevent the bringing of imports controversies before federal
district courts on the basis of inadequate relief in the Court of
International Trade. Finally, the adjudication of claims in the cor-
rect forum should be facilitated by the provision that actions im-
properly commenced in a federal district court are to be transfer-
red to the Court of International Trade and vice versa. 5 This pro-
vision implies that the court in which the action is first filed should
determine which court has jurisdiction.
While the Act specifically addressed problems concerning the
division of jurisdiction between the federal district courts and the
Court of International Trade, it did not provide any mechanism
for the consolidation of actions that are only in part within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of International Trade.36
Testimony in the Congressional hearings had noted potential prob-
lems in not providing some overlapping jurisdiction for complex
cases. 7 The related actions filed by Alberta Gas Chemicals in the
former Customs Court and a federal district court illustrate some
Customs Courts Act of 1980 S 201, 28 U.S.C.A. S 1581.
31 Customs Courts Act of 1980 S 201, 28 U.S.C.A. S 1581(iX1)-(3). This grant of exclusive
jurisdiction over the enumerated residual matters affecting imports shifts the caseload
from the federal district courts to the Court of International Trade. The grant was intend-
ed to make clear that such suits are properly commenced only in the Court of Interna-
tional Trade. H.R. REP. No. 96-1235, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 47 (1980).
Customs Courts Act of 1980 S 201, 28 U.S.C.A. S 1583.
H.R. REP. No. 96-1235, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 49-50 (1980).
Customs Courts Act of 1980 S 201, 28 U.S.C.A. S 1585. See supra note 18.
Customs Courts Act of 1980 S 201, 28 U.S.C.A. S 1584.
, Prior to the passage of the Act, the part of the action within the jurisdiction of the
federal district court would not be addressed by either court. The Customs Court would
hear only the matters within its jurisdiction. See supra note 28.
3See Customs Courts Act of 1979, S. 1654: Hearing on S. 1654 Before the Subcomm. on
Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st
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problems that may arise as a result of the lack of overlapping
jurisdiction between the courts.3"
Both actions involved the importation of methanol produced by
plaintiff. Plaintiff's claim against the United States arose when
the Treasury Department issued a Finding of Dumping39 based on
the determination by the International Trade Commission that the
importation of methanol at less than fair value would likely injure
American methanol producers. 0 Plaintiff first challenged the Find-
ing of Dumping in the Customs Court,41 but before the matter was
resolved, plaintiff filed a tort action against Celanese Corporation
in federal district court.42 The central issue in the tort claim was
whether allegedly false testimony concerning the projected demand
for methanol influenced the Commission's determination of likely
injury to the domestic industry. 3 In dicta, the district court stated
that exclusive jurisdiction concerning the Finding of Dumping lay
in the Customs Court, but that the Commission should first recon-
sider its determination of likely injury to the domestic methanol
industry in light of the alleged perjury." The case was dismissed
for failure to state a cause of action.45 On appeal, the Second Cir-
cuit stayed the tort action until the Commission reconsidered its
determination." The rationale for the specific holding was that any
tribunal, including an administrative agency, has the inherent power
to reconsider its determinations in view of possible perjury in pro-
ceedings before it."7
Although the district court stated in dicta that jurisdiction over
the validity of the Finding of Dumping lay in the Customs Court,'8
the Second Circuit refused to reach the issue of jurisdiction.'9 It
Sess. 10-12 (1979) (testimony of David M. Cohen); see generally Cohen, The "Residual Jurisdic-
tion" of the Court of International Trade Under the Customs Courts Act of 1980, 26 N.Y.L.
SCH. L. REV. 471, 488 (1981).
' Chronologically, Alberta Gas Chemicals brought the following actions concerning the
importation of methyl alcohol: Alberta Gas Chems., Inc. v. Blumenthal, 467 F. Supp. 1245
(Cust. Ct. 1979) (see supra note 1); Alberta Gas Chems., Inc. v. United States, 483 F. Supp.
303 (Cust. Ct. 1980); Alberta Gas Chems.. Ltd. v. Celanese Corp., 497 F. Supp. 637 (S.D.N.Y.
1980), remanded with instructions, 650 F2d 9 (2d Cir. 1981).
Alberta Gas Chems., Ltd. v. Celanese Corp., 650 F.2d 9, 11 (2d Cir. 1981).
'Id.
41 Id.
Alberta Gas. Chems., Ltd. v. Celanese Corp., 497 F. Supp. 637 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
, Id. at 639.
Id. at 639, 641.
,s Id. at 639.
Alberta Gas Chems., Ltd. v. Celanese Corp., 650 F.2d 9, 14 (2d Cir. 1981).
Id. at 13.
' See supra notes 43 and 44 and the text to which they pertain.
" Alberta Gas Chems., Ltd. v. Celanese Corp., 650 F.2d 9, 14 (2d Cir. 1981).
236 [Vol. 12:231
CUSTOM COURTS ACT
should be noted at this point that the Customs Court Act of 1980
went into effect after the decision by the district court and prior
to the decision by the Second Circuit."0 Although the Second Cir-
cuit did note that the lower court considered its jurisdiction to
be dubious,"1 it nevertheless ruled on the appeal and remanded
the case to the district court.52 That court was to retain jurisdic-
tion in the event that the Commission did find the perjury by
Celanese influenced its determination of likely injury, thereby pro-
viding a basis for the damage claim against Celanese.'
The Second Circuit's decision does not obviate the possibility
of a different result in the action before the Court of International
Trade. Since the first action was still pending in the Court of In-
ternational Trade,u essentially the same question is being litigated
concurrently in the two forums. This situation may result in con-
flicting decisions. For example, if evidence of fraud is not introduced
in the proceeding in the Court of International Trade, that court
may hold the Finding of Dumping to be valid. The district court,
on the other hand, may be compelled to dismiss the action if the
Finding of Dumping is invalid. This would occur if the Commis-
sion, upon reconsideration in light of the alleged perjury, withdraws
its original finding of likely injury.5 If, according to the Commis-
sion, there is a valid basis for overturning the Finding of Dump-
ing, the proceeding in the Court of International Trade should also
be affected by that information. However, although the holding
of the Second Circuit implies that no further litigation should be
pursued in either court until the Commission exercises its inherent
power to reconsider its determination, the holding binds only the
district court.
It is possible that there were valid reasons for plaintiff to have
brought the action against Celanese Corporation in federal district
court. Plaintiff alleged that the damage relief it sought was not
available in the Customs Court, as a damage claim against a
domestic producer could not, and under the 1980 Act still cannot,
be brought in the Court of International Trade.' The district court,
' Customs Courts Act of 1980 S 701.





Alberta Gas Chems., Ltd. v. Celanese Corp., 497 F. Supp. 637, 641 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
The Customs Courts Act of 1980 only provides for jurisdiction when either party was the
United States or an officer or agency thereof. Customs Courts Act of 1980 S 201, 28 U.S.C.A.
SS 1581-83.
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however, pointed out that plaintiff was seeking primarily a "declara-
tion that the Commission was misled by false testimony and would
have reached a different result but for that testimony.""7 If the
Commission changed its determination, plaintiff would have no
damage claim.' Without a damage claim, the federal district court
would not have jurisdiction over an imports controversy.59 Thus,
plaintiffs tort action may be viewed as an effort to avoid the
jurisdiction of the Court of International Trade.1°
The Second Circuit could have found that there was no need
for litigation of the issue of fraud in the district court and transfer-
red the case to the Court of International Trade. The Court of
International Trade then would determine whether the Commis-
Sion should reconsider its determination." This would be more ap-
propriate, as this court has jurisdiction to review Commission deter-
minations when final.' Therefore, if the Second Circuit had transfer-
red the perjury issue to the Court of International Trade, plaintiff
would not be denied the damage relief sought.
It may be argued that the disposition of this case has constricted
the effective jurisdiction of the Court of International Trade.
Because the Second Circuit formulated the issue as one within the
jurisdiction of the Court of International Trade,' it should have
stayed the action in the federal district court and transferred the
case to the Court of International Trade.
The problem remains that neither the district court nor the Court
of International Trade is empowered to adjudicate both the tort
claim and the Finding of Dumping underlying it. A provision for
concurrent jurisdiction, rejected by Congress, would have permit-
ted the entire matter to be heard in the district court." While such
an alternative would expedite review and further the goal of judicial
economy, it would fail to utilize the expertise of the judges of the
Court of International Trade and possibly violate the constitutional
"7 Alberta Gas Chems., Ltd. v. Celanese Corp., 497 F. Supp. 637, 641 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
58 Id.
59 Id.
' See supra note 29 and the text to which it pertains.
" The same three reasons that motivated the expansion of the jurisdiction of the Court
of International Trade by the Customs Courts Act of 1980 would direct that court to take
jurisdiction over the present issue: the constitutional mandate of uniformity in customs
matters, the need to relieve the overburdened federal district courts from trying matters
not necessarily within their jurisdiction, and the availability of the expertise of the judges
of the Court of International Trade. See supra notes 11, 12, and 13 and the text to which
they pertain.
Alberta Gas Chems., Ltd. v. Celanese Corp., 497 F. Supp. 637, 641 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
See id. and Alberta Gas Chems., Ltd. v. Celanese Corp., 650 F.2d 9, 12 (2d Cir. 1981).
See supra note 36.
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mandate for uniformity in customs matters. Were the jurisdiction
of the Court of International Trade further expanded to allow it
to hear the entire controversy involving the administrative agency,5
the importer, and the affected domestic industry, the goals of uni-
formity, expedited review, and use of judicial expertise would be
served. As an unfortunate consequence, however, such expanded
jurisdiction would burden the Court of International Trade with
matters outside its areas of expertise. It is important to note that
the problem of non-overlapping jurisdiction is not limited to tort
claims concerning importation, but also has arisen in a recent anti-
trust case.6
The goal of the Customs Courts Act of 1980 to enable the rights
of all parties to be adjudicated in a single forum 7 has not been
implemented, at least not in situations where tort or antitrust
claims exist against competitors." The effects of the Second Cir-
cuit decision were to resist judicial economy and constrict the
jurisdiction of the Court of International Trade. Plaintiff may
have had valid reasons for bringing the second action in federal
district court, but the transfer of the issue of the validity of the
Finding of Dumping to the Court of International Trade would have
implemented more effectively the goals of the Customs Courts Act
of 1980. Without denying plaintiff the relief of tort damages,
however, there is no alternative to splitting the controversy be-
tween the two courts involved.
Maija S. Blaubergs
' The International Trade Commission was involved in the Alberta Gas Chemicals cases.
See supra note 38. The Customs Service was involved in Nike, Inc. v. Rubber Mfrs. Ass'n,
Inc., 509 F. Supp. 912 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). See infra note 66.
" In this case, the court in dicta stated that evidence established in the Court of Inter-
national Trade could be used in a subsequent antitrust proceeding in the district court.
Nike, Inc. v. Rubber Mfrs. Ass'n, Inc., 509 F. Supp. 912, 918 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). The defen-
dants in this case were alleged to have provided false information that influenced the Customs
Service to charge plaintiff excessive duties. Id. at 914. The district court stayed the pro-
ceedings to allow plaintiff to pursue the appropriate remedies before the Customs Service,
and, if necessary, before the Court of International Trade. Id. at 918. In this controversy
concerning duty on imported footwear, jurisdiction again was split between the district
court in which the antitrust action would have to be heard and the Court of International
Trade.
H.R. REP. No. 96-1235, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 49-50 (1980).
6 See supra note 66.
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